G 30 S. PKI folly or the first phase of a foreign encouraged coup?
This essay explores the events before and after ‘G-30-S’ in an endeavor to help clarify whether it was a PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) conceived folly or the first phase of a Machiavellian coup whereby a foreign encouraged campaign could be justified to wipe out an unsophisticated PKI. The sources presented within this essay attempt to reflect the arguments, opinions and involvement from both points of view – a disastrous pre-emptive communist folly or a ‘Reichstag fire’. The early hours of October 1st 1965 saw the commencement of a change of power in the sixth most populous country in the world, which did not conclude until a further 23 weeks of excessive bloodshed and turmoil had passed. The events in 1965-1966 brought to power Suharto and what has been described as his 32-year ‘New Order’ dictatorship. The term G-30-S (Gerakan September Tiga Puluh – GESTAPU or Thirty September Movement) originates from a confusing radio announcement made the same morning (October 1st) by an obscure Lieutenant-Colonel Untung, proclaiming the formation of a Revolutionary Council but one still under the leadership of President Sukarno. Within hours the suffix ‘– PKI’ had been added to it, although at this stage there had been no indication of their complicity.
In 1955 President Sukarno held a conference in Bandung proposing a non-aligned and anti imperialist movement of the Third World. He upset the US administration by calling for independence from the western powers, especially the US who perceived Socialism, Non-Alignment and self-centered Nationalism as alternate forms of Communism – the if you’re not for us then you must be against us syndrome. Subsequently by 1956, the Eisenhower administration “relying on the policy of plausible denial”, had “begun to grope its way toward a second, covert track of policy augmenting its official diplomatic track”  using the CIA to back a number of rebel groups in the outer islands. In particular, Sumatra and Sulawesi, who wanted independence – or at least a greater degree of autonomy – from 'Javanese Colonialism' under Sukarno. The US strategy was to play upon this division as a means to decrease the power of Sukarno, they hoped by backing these break away states they would gain their support and influence them to have a pro American attitude.
However due to poor intelligence and irrefutable evidence of deliberate covert action, "by mid-1958 the Eisenhower administration had been forced to acknowledge that its Indonesian intervention had failed."  Thus, since the mid 1950s the CIA had been involved in Indonesian political affairs. William Blum, (who worked in the State Department until 1967 and later with former CIA officer Phillip Agee in the mid-1970s) is adamant in his opinion that the CIA "had undoubtedly infiltrated the PKI at various levels, and the military even more so, and was thus in a good position to disseminate disinformation and plant the ideas for certain action." They felt Sukarno was becoming too powerful and extreme in his opposition to them and the failure the Agency-backed military uprising did not deter them. "Various reports of the early 1960s indicated a continuing interest in this end" and their intent became to isolate Sukarno in Asia and Africa. It was even quoted in an official CIA memorandum of June 1962 that it was “... agreed to liquidate President Sukarno, depending upon the situation and available opportunities."
Tensions further intensified in 1964 when Britain proposed the creation of a new Federation of Malaysia by merging the Federation of Malaya, (independent since 1957) with Singapore and two giant, British-administered territories in Borneo; Sabah and Sarawak without local referenda. Sukarno felt it was their right to have them to decide whether these territories wanted to become independent, or to join with either the Philippines, Indonesia or to merge with Malaya. The Department of State was against any plebiscite, and a Memorandum from the Secretary of State, Benjamin H. Read to the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, prior to Kennedy’s forth coming meeting with Sukarno in Tokyo included the following point: - “4). It is highly desirable that the solution coming out of the tripartite talks be one that the parti-cipants themselves develop. But one form that this might take but which we should not mention to any of the participants is for the Malaysians to guarantee to do in North Borneo exactly what the Indonesians do in fulfillment of their UN pledge for a ‘plebiscite’ in West New Guinea – but only if there is no subversive or guerrilla warfare in the intervening five years” (Emphasis added)
(Note- Sukarno had had to promise a referendum for the indigenous people of Irian Jaya to be carried out by 1969 as a UN imposed condition on assuming its sovereignty).
However, the reason this was strenuously avoided by the British was their fear that the outcome of the vote could not be as easily controlled as Irian Jaya's plebiscite could be. Whilst Sukarno expected the support of the USA in backing his demand for the self-determination for the peoples of British Borneo, the reality was that Washington was concerned that this new-found stand of independence would mean they were no longer under the influence of America's power. Their refusal convinced both Sukarno and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, General Abdul Harris Nasution that America was in collusion with Britain.
It was during this time that American fears over the 'Domino Theory' caused their deep involvement in the fight against the nationalist Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, driving him to seek closer ties with his communist neighbor, the Peoples Republic of China. Their actions there were subject to much criticism by both Sukarno and Nasution and they saluted the struggle of Vietnam's National Liberation Front. After increasing tension, Indonesia finally withdrew from the United Nations and the World Bank in January 1965 in anger over Malaysia's winning a seat on the Security Council. Anti American sentiments increased in Indonesia and some offices of U.S. Oil companies were seized. There was a great fear that they would be nationalised at any moment without compensation even though the American Managers were still permitted to remain. It was decided that something was to be done, according to American views, Sukarno was growing too confident over his success in asserting sovereignty over Irian Jaya at the expense of the Dutch. His plans for non-alignment with the Western powers and the setting up of rival to the UN known a CONEFO (Conference of Newly Emerging Forces) the following year and “his latest boast that he will explode an atomic bomb in November”,  was disconcerting them.
On August 17th 1965, Sukarno proposed in his Independence Day speech that a ‘anti imperialist axis’ of ‘New Emerging Forces’ would be established, from Peking via Pyongyang and Phnom Penh to Jakarta. Although this idea was never realized, it did instigate a closer relationship with China. Thus, it was only less than seven weeks later that the bloody massacre, named G-30-S, occurred. In these events, what was the role, if any, of the CIA?
"It is argued that GESTAPU was not an action by progressive or dissatisfied middle level military officers, nor a creature of the PKI, nor was it stimulated by President Sukarno. GESTAPU was an instrument directly in the hands of General Suharto and most likely a creation of the CIA. For the purpose of "saving Indonesia from communism", in a desperate situation. GESTAPU served the crucial function of providing a legitimate pretext for the drastic extermination of the PKI. It was calculated to put the reigns of power quickly into the hands of Suharto and to place Sukarno in a restricted position."
Evidence of this claim lies with one of the few surviving victims of the ‘G-30-S’ affair, Minister/Chief-of-Staff of the Air Force, Omar Dani. After his release in 1995, he finally had a chance to speak out, insisting that “the CIA was deeply involved and Harto was the hand they used.” He reasons that “At that time, there were no generals in Indonesia who could carry out an intelligence operation as sophisticated as G-30-S.” Correspondingly, Green confirms U.S. involvement and Dani’s statement by saying “I know we had a lot more information (about the PKI) than the Indonesians themselves…The U.S. supplied information was far superior to anything they had.” (Here he is referring to the Martens’ List, explained further on in the essay.)
However the story that is widely believed by most is in the rumour that a Generals’ Council was aiming to take over the government on October 5th, Army Day. The CIA Study believed that there was a Generals’ Council whose purpose was to devise a way to protect itself from a purported plan of Sukarno to crush the army. In a supposed pre-emptive action, these generals, Gen. Ahmad Dani, Maj. Gen. Suprapto, Maj. Gen. Harjono, Maj. Gen. S. Parman, Brig. Gen. D.I. Pandjaitan, and Brig. Gen. Sutojo Siswomihardjo were abducted and eventually found dead in the LUBANG BUAYA (Crocodile Hole) to the South of the Halim air base. The public was told in a mass media propaganda campaign that the Generals had been castrated and had their eyes gouged out by members of Gerwani when in fact the autopsies, done two days before the campaign was released, showed “all the victims had been gunned down by military weapons.” The consequence of this report would’ve evoked anti-communist sentiments in the public, because it exaggerates the horror of the murders and blames the PKI. This evidence correlates with Johnson’s theory that ‘G-30-S’ provided the excuse needed to annihilate the PKI. Furthermore, a CIA Memorandum confirms “They (the Army) have instituted psychological warfare mechanisms, control of media pre-requisite to influencing public opinion and have harassed or halted Communist output.” Was PKI participation induced to provide the excuse for its destruction?
There are, in fact, indications of an agent provocateur in the unfolding drama, one Kamarusaman bin Ahmed Mubaidah, known as Sjam. According to the later testimony of some of the arrested officers, it was Sjam who pushed the idea of the hostile Generals’ Council and for the need to counteract it. At the trials and in the CIA Study the attempt is made to establish that, in doing so, Sjam was acting on behalf of PKI leader Aidit. Presentation of this premise may explain why the CIA took the unique step of publishing such a study – to assign responsibility for the coup attempt to the PKI so as to ‘justify’ the horror that followed. But Sjam could just have easily acted for the CIA and/or the Generals in the same manner. In the same study, it is stated as Sjam being a “double agent” and professed “informer for the Djakarta Military Command.” He apparently was a trusted aide of Aidit and could have induced the PKI leader into the plot instead of the other way around. Sjam had a politically chequered and mysterious background, and his testimony – at one of the trials in which he appeared as a defendant – was aimed at establishing Aidit as the sole director of a PKI coup attempt. What was the nature and extent, if any, of PKI involvement in the alleged Putsch attempt? The semi official account stated that the PKI’s aim was not to seize political power for itself but to prevent the army from eliminating the Party after Sukarno's death.
One question that has never been answered by those who call G-30-S a PKI ‘coup’ is, why would the Indonesian communist party (PKI), then the third largest communist party in the world, have staged such an action and not called its supporters out onto the streets? In fact, a report made by the American Consul in Medan, clearly states, “The PKI offered: no meaningful resistance.” 
An interview last year with former Bureau Chief of the CIA in Jakarta Hugh Tovar, he insists that “the US did not in any way help the army suppress the communists. The communists attempted to launch a coup against the government by using the military and the Army reacted. But there was no way that the US had a hand in that. The CIA did not do it…We did not know anything about the communist attempt to overthrow the Indonesian government. That was a surprise to everyone.”
If the CIA claims to have not helped the army in any way, how can they deny the State Department Cable sent from Washington to Jakarta on October 29th outlining its policy on Indonesia. “…army…must take initiative to form a military… provisional government, with or without Sukarno…Begin to influence people and events…Small Arms and equipment may be needed to deal with PKI.” And how can they deny their policy towards Indonesia if it is documented in a Memorandum so easily available to the public? “The U.S. in particular will certainly be affected favorably by the degree to which the U.S. can now provide limited aid the military leaders feel they require.” Tovar contradicts Green’s Telegram to Washington by insisting that only communication equipment was given to Suharto, “no small arms nor any arms of any kind” and maintains he knows nothing of the Rp50 million given to Adam Malik. Also, Marshall Green continues to deny the significance of the involvement: “We only supplied walkie-talkies, not money”. Unfortunately for Green, his prevarication is exposed in the official documented history of the National Security Archives: “1. This (telegram) is to confirm my earlier concurrence that we provide Malik with fifty million Rupiahs requested by him for the activities of the Kap-Gestapu movement. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified].”  Why would this information be classified if indeed the CIA had nothing to hide, and had not given money to Suharto?
It was not until 1990 that further information was disclosed about American involvement concerning the Martens’ list, a comprehensive 5000 plus name list from the highest powers to the lower echelons of the army right down to ordinary villagers believed to be ‘communist’ operatives. (Similar to the Phoenix Program used in Vietnam) Robert Martens, a former member of the US Embassy's political section in Jakarta admitted in 1990, “It was a really big help to the army. They probably killed a lot of people, and I probably have a lot of blood on my hands, but that's not all bad. There's a time when you have to strike hard at a decisive moment.”  This controversial list was the one handed to Adam Malik via the CIA and was the instigator of the mass slaughter that would follow. One that would be described as “one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century”  It was their intention for a swift destruction of the PKI to curb Sukarno's authority. In a cable sent to Washington, dated October 5th, US Ambassador Marshall Green wrote: “Whatever the background … army in control, and it has important instruments of power such as press, radio and TV. It also has cause in murder of six top leaders if army chooses to use it and has already begun to do so…Muslim groups and others are lined up behind army PKI has suffered serious setback for its endorsement of, and perhaps participation in, discredited Sept. Movement…Army now has opportunity to move against PKI if it acts quickly…Momentum is now at peak with discovery of bodies of murdered army leaders. In short, it’s now or never…” 
The uncertainty Green shows in whether the PKI participated in the October abductions highlights the hypocrisy shown in the enthusiasm to take advantage of the situation. Further on, his recommendations to Washington were to: “Avoid overt involvement as power struggle unfolds…However, indicate clearly to key people in the army such as Nasution and Suharto our desire to be of assistance where we can…Maintain and if possible extend our contact with military, and: Spread the story of PKI’s guilt, treachery and brutality.” How can Tovar deny CIA involvement when instructions are stated quite clearly in this cable to generate anti-communist hatred? Although it could be said that Green was merely being an opportunist, a statement made by his predecessor US Ambassador Howard P. Jones at a Conference of Chiefs of Missions in Baguio, the Philippines, on 10 March 1965, is of significant importance. He informed senior American officials that – “from our viewpoint, of course, an unsuccessful coup attempt by the PKI might be the most effective development to start a reversal of political trends in Indonesia.”  (This would consequently allow the Army to be free to crack down on the communists). Further evidence of American objectives was documented almost a year earlier: “Our basic objectives with regard Indonesia (sic) continue to be what we can do to keep Indonesia out of Communist control…” 
These factors suggest the US did know of the ‘Coup’ and played a major role in instigating it. Due to the Truman Doctrine, and the ‘Domino Theory’ one would have expected the US to have stepped in with armed intervention, to prevent the ‘spread of communism’ as it had dominated a large part of their foreign policy. However, they were not involved to that extent. Perhaps it was because they felt it was unnecessary to send in troops to fight the PKI because they were aware the PKI could offer little resistance, and because they were aware it was not a PKI pre-emptive coup. Maybe they knew through their discussions they had had on their “five-phased program” of covert action,  and the money they would continue to disburse from their “black bag operation”;  the Martens’ list they had compiled, and with their tacit approval of an agenda prepared by Suharto and his inner group of advisors and co-conspirators, that the PKI were to “no longer exist as an organization”  and that the military backed regime would take over, under the rule of Suharto.
The blood-shed continued and Soharto became emboldened as more pressure was put on Sukarno. “Sukarno’s attempt to save his position through Cabinet appointments, which included some PKI members, only served to further alienate much of the already hostile military leadership. In practical terms, Sukarno gave almost carte blanche to Suharto to ‘restore order’ in a letter of 11 March 1966, which was referred to as ‘Supersemar’.”  "The US Ambassador Marshall Green could hardly withhold his jubilation".  KOGAM – Order number One – was issued on March 12th, whereby the PKI and all affiliated groups, were to be dissolved and permanently proscribed throughout Indonesia. Suharto at last had authority to act on own initiative and was only required to report to Sukarno on action taken.
ARCHIVED AND OCCASIONAL PAPERS 1. Brief History of the Allen Pope Case, box 114 PSF files JFK Library, 14 March 1966. 2. U.S Central Intelligence Agency, Research Study: Indonesia -The Coup that Backfired, 1968 . 3. CIA Memorandum,Declassified Documents Reference System, Arlington, Virginia, 1975 volume. 4. David Johnson, Gestapu: The CIA's "Track Two" in Indonesia, 1976, reprinted October 1995, – http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/54b/033.html also at http://www.isnet.org/~G30S/David01.html 5. Paul. H. Salim, The Gestapu “Coup”, Soc.Culture.Indonesia Newsgroup, 1995, copy at: – http://www.isnet.org/~djoko/G30S/Salim02.html 6. I Gusti Agung Ayu Ratih, Soeharto’s New Order State: Imposed Illusions and Invented Legitimations, (Presented as the final paper for Master of Arts in Southeast Asian Studies- History, University of Wisconsin- Madison, Spring 1997) – http://www.geocities.com/mkb_id/arsip/Ayu/ayu_finale.pdf PUBLICATIONS 7. Benedict Anderson and Ruth T. McVey, A Preliminary Analysis of the October1, 1965 Coup in Indonesia, Ithica: Cornell University, 1971. 8. Malcolm Caldwell, (editor) Ten Years’ Military Terror in Indonesia, Spokesman Books, 1975. Contributing authors also include; Ernst Utrecht, Oey Hong Lee, W.F. Wertheim, Carmel Budiardjo, G.W. Satyajit, Adil Rakindo, Ingrid Palmer, Richard W. Franke, Lenny Siegel, and Peter Dale Scott. 9. David Ransom, Ford Country: Building an Elite for Indonesia, (pp. 93-116 of The Trojan Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid – Palo Alto CA: Ramparts Press, 1975 revised edition) - (Public Information Research) http://www.pir.org/ransom.html or http://www.cia-on-campus.org/internat/indo.html 10. Joseph Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, G. P. Putnam's Sons, NY, 1976. 11. Brian May, Indonesian Tragedy, Graham Brash (PTE) LTD Singapore, 1978, 2001. 12. Loch K. Johnson's, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1985. 13. Encyclopedia Americana, Volumes 9 & 12 etc., Grolier Incorporated, USA 1985. 14. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; The Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Fontana Press, 1989. 15. Audrey R. & George T. Kahin's Subversion As Foreign Policy – The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, The New Press New York, 1995. 16. Volume XXIII Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963 (Southeast Asia), Government Printing Office, March 1995. – http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/frus/frus61-63ix/index.html 17. William Blum, Killing Hope, Common Courage Press, 1995. 18. John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars; CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through the Persian Gulf, Elephant Paperbacks, Ivan R. Dee, Chicago, 1996. 19. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam; A History, Penguin Books, 1997. 20. Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, Oxford University Press, 1998. 21. Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting; Indonesia’s Search for Stability, Allen and Unwin, 1999. 22. Volume XXVI Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968,: Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines– Government Printing Office, also available at George Washington University’s National Security Archive, www.nsarchive.org 23. Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand - Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence, John Murray, London, 2001. PERIODICALS AND NEWS MEDIA ARTICLES 24. Life Magazine, 11 July 1966. 25. WF. Wertheim, Suharto and the Untung Coup – The Missing Link, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 1, No.2, Winter 1970, pp. 50ff. (no longer in English on web)  26. W.F. Wertheim, Whose Plot? -New Light on 1965 Events, Journal of Contemporary Asia Vol. 9 No.2, 1979. 27. Peter Dale Scott, The United States and the Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-1967, Pacific Affairs Vol. 58, Summer 1985, pp. 239-64. – Public Information Research Site – http://www.pir.org/scott.html or http://home.sprintmail.com/~pir/scott.html 28. Kathy Kadene, San Francisco Examiner, May 20, 1990, – Public Information Research Site. –http://www.pir.org/kadane.html 29. Lisa Pease, JFK, Indonesia, CIA & Freeport Sulphur, Probe Magazine, (Part 2) – Vol. 3, No. 4, May-June, 1996. –http://www.realhistoryarchives.com/collections/hidden/freeport-indonesia.html 30. The Latief Case: Suharto's Involvement Revealed, Journal of Contemporary Asia, Unknown Date. 31. Marion Wilkinson, Hidden Holocaust, Spectrum Section, Sydney Morning Herald, 10th July, 1999. – http://www.huaren.org/focus/id/071099-01.html (Free copy site) 32. Benedict Anderson, Petrus Dadi Ratu – Suharto’s Coup [1 & 2], review of Colonel Abdul Latief's Defence. Speech at his trial in 1979, printed in Tempo Magazine, 10-16 April 2000. – http://www.malaysia.net/lists/sangkancil.html 33. Tempo Magazine, No. 21/I/January 30-February 5, 2001, – Cover Story: They finally Speak Out…, i) Introduction – http://www.tempo.co.id/majalah/arsip/1st/edition21/index-uk.html ii) Omar Dani & Halim Perdana Kusuma - http://www.tempo.co.id/majalah/arsip/1st/edition21/cov-2.html. iii) The CIA was Involved & Suharto was the Hand.. http://www.tempo.co.id/majalah/arsip/1st/edition21/cov-3.html iv) Subandrio’s Story – http://www.tempo.co.id/majalah/arsip/1st/edition21/cov-4.html v) Subandrio: “I was victimized” –http://www.tempo.co.id/majalah/arsip/1st/edition21/cov-5.html vi) Dr. Greg Poulgrain, Research Fellow, Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane., 1965. - Suharto’s Sight were set On Dhani & Subandrio. - http://www.tempo.co.id/majalah/arsip/1st/edition21/cov-6.html vii) Irfan Budiman,Purwani Diyah Prabandari, Dwi Arjanto and Setiyardi/CM.,The Year of Living Safely, – http://www.tempo.co.id/majalah/arsip/1st/edition21/cov-7.html 34. Tempo Magazine, No. 48/I/August 7-13, 2001. Books: The Sensor and the CIA. – http://www.tempointeraktif.com/majalah/eng/bok-1.html 35. Tempo Magazine, No. 04/II/October 2-8 2001, Index – http://www.tempointeraktif.com/majalah/arsip/2jp/jap05/lit-list.html i) Seno Joko Suyono, Purwani Diyah Prabandari, Gita W. Laksmini, Arief Kuswardono (Jakarta), Ahmad Fuadi (Washington, DC) A List Behind the Bloodbath – http://www.tempointeraktif.com/majalah/arsip/2jp/jap05/lit-1.html ii) Ahmad Fuadi ,Interview with Kathy Kadene, on her San Francisco Examiner Article, "The US government and CIA destroyed the PKI" – http://www.tempointeraktif.com/majalah/arsip/2jp/jap05/lit-2.html iii) Interview by Purwani Diyah Prabandari, of CIA chief Hugh Tovar:"The CIA did not do it" –http://www.tempointeraktif.com/majalah/arsip/2jp/jap05/lit-3.html iv) Asvi Warman Adam, Reconstructing, piece by piece, – http://www.tempointeraktif.com/majalah/arsip/2jp/jap05/lit-4.html v) Yusi, Avianto Pareanom, Setiyardi, Gita W.L.,The Ford Foundation – a Two-faced Charity? http://www.tempointeraktif.com/majalah/arsip/2jp/jap05/lit-5.html FOOTNOTES  The Reichstag fire on February 27th 1933, during what could have been a close election, was blamed by the Nazis on the communists and enabled Hitler to justified theirs and the Social Democrats’ persecution and to use it as a pretext for issuing emergency laws and suspending many basic and guaranteed rights. It is generally believed that it was deliberately lit by the Nazis. (Encyclopedia Americana,Vol 12, p. 692, Grolier Incorporated, USA 1985).  John Prados, Presidents’ Secret Wars; CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations from World War II through the Persian Gulf, (Elephant Paperbacks, 1996), p. 130.  Audrey R. & George McT. Kahin's Subversion As Foreign Policy - The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia, p. 7 referring to Loch K. Johnson’s, A Season of Inquiry: The Senate Intelligence Investigation (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1985), pp. 58-59.  Ibid, pp. 84-85.  (The Allen Pope Case) Ibid, pp. 179-182. Also: Richard J. Aldrich, The Hidden Hand – Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence – John Murray, London, 2001 – Chapter 26, Working Groups: Special Operations in the Third World, p.590 & 24n - Brief History of the Allen Pope Case, March 14, 1961, box 114, PSF files JFK Library.  Ibid. p. 18.  William Blum, Killing Hope, (Common Courage Press 1995), pp. 99-103; 193-97  Ibid, p. 100; & Joseph Burkholder Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior, (G. P. Putnam's Sons, NY, 1976) pp. 210-11.  Ibid, p.195.  Ibid, p.195, from Note #16: CIA Memorandum, June 18 1962, Declassified Documents Reference System (Arlington, Virginia, 1975) Document 240A.  Volume XXVI p. 30. of the "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968,: Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines” (Vol. XXVI-FRUS) - #13 An Enclosed Memo in a Memorandum from Read to McGeorge Bundy; the President’s Special Assistant for National Security - Washington January 13,1964"  Vol. XXVI-FRUS pp.166-67. #77 Memorandum of Conversation on a Military Contingency Talk [Reascertainment (sic) in Malaysian Borneo] in London with Stewart & Foster, (Brit. Embassy); Bundy, Green, Cuthell & Conlon (US Govt.) - Washington September 28,1964"  “The assumption that if one country in South-East Asia were to fall to the Communists all the other countries in the region would fall, one after the other, like dominoes.” (Encyclopedia Americana, Vol. 9, p. 276, Grolier Incorporated, USA 1985)  Vol XXVI-FRUS p.274. #129 Memorandum from the Director, Far East Region (Blouin) to the Assistant Secretary of Defence for International Security Affairs (McNaughton) - Subject: - “Further Deterioration in Relations with Indonesia” - WashingtonAugust 3,1964  David Johnson, Gestapu: The CIA’s “Track Two” in Indonesia 1976, reprinted October 1995,  Both quotes are in an Interview in Tempo Magazine – Jakarta, January 30-February 5, 2001  Kathy Kadene, Washington Post, May 21, 1990.  U.S Central Intelligence Agency, Research Study: Indonesia: The Coup that Backfired, 1968 (cited hereafter as CIA Study)  The Communist Party’s women’s affiliation.  Benedict Anderson, Petrus Dadi Ratu, review of Colonel Abdul Latief’s Defence Speech at his trial in 1979, printed in Tempo Magazine, April 10-16, 2000.  Vol XXVI-FRUS p.362 # 172 Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, November 9th, 1965.  U.S Central Intelligence Agency, Research Study: Indonesia —The Coup that Backfired, 1968 (cited hereafter as CIA Study) p.107.  Marion Wilkinson, Hidden Holocaust - Spectrum Section - Sydney Morning Herald, July 10, 1999, Cable from American Consul in Medan, November 16, 1965  Tempo Magazine, Interview of Hugh Tovar by Purwani Diyah Prabandri, October 2-8 2001  Marion Wilkinson, Hidden Holocaust - Spectrum Section - Sydney Morning Herald, July 10, 1999, Cable from American Consul in Medan, November 16, 1965  Vol XXVI-FRUS p.362 # 172 Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, November 9, 1965  Tempo Magazine, The Sensor and the CIA, # 48 August 7-13, 2001  Vol XXVI-FRUS p. 379 # 179 Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Djakarta, December 2, 1965.  Tempo Magazine, October 8, 2001, referring to Kathy Kadane’s interview (see next note).  Kathy Kadene, San Fransisco Examiner, May 20, 1990  Ibid.  Life Magazine, July 11, 1966  Vol XXVI-FRUS p.307 # 147 Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Djakarta October 5 1965  This event was recorded in Audrey R. & George McT. Kahin's Subversion As Foreign Policy - The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia,, page 225. (As quoted from the typescript Statement of Ambassador Howard P. Jones as documented at the Hoover Institute Archives). Author's Note: For some reason this document (archived at the Hoover Institute) was found not to be worthy for inclusion in the Official Records of Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968.- Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore;Philippines. For instance, in a search throughout the 857 pages of (Vol XXV1- FRUS), the nearest hints one can glean in reference to the March 10, 1965 Baguio Conference of Chiefs of Missions are as follows: a) Last Paragraph of Document #115: Telegram #1784 (Dated Djakarta March 8, 1965 5.00 p.m.) From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Repeated to Manila for Bundy and FELG, and to CINPAC, Medan, and Surabaya. p. 248. Quote:- "(AIDTO 1055 received after preparation this message but presents no basic inconsistency with USAID proposal in paragraph 1 above. Will reply part 1 following Baguio discussions. Response part 2 being provided separately.)" Source: National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) RG 59, Central Files 1964-66 POL INDON-US. b) The next Official Document #116 - a Memo from Cooper to Bundy, (Dated Washington, March 13, 1965), refers to a suggestion of Ambassador Jones outlined in an "attached" document (being Telegram #1850 from Djakarta, March 13, but NOT attached to the above Archived Memo (of NARA,RG 59,CF 1964-66, POL INDON-US) [ i.e. Nothing in the Official XXVI-FRUS Archives about the Baguio Conference of Chiefs of Missions.]  Vol XXVI-FRUS p.167. #78 Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Certain Posts, Washington, October 22, 1964.  Truman Doctrine (1947) states its purpose “to help free people to maintain their institutions and their integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes” -Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers; Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, (Fontana Press, 1989), p.479.  Vol XXVI-FRUS pp.162-64. #76 Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency for the Department of State, Subject:- “PROSPECTS FOR COVERT ACTION” Washington, September 18, 1964 – N.B. This includes – between Paragraphs 5 and 15 – the Archivist note: “[Here follow paragraphs 6–14, which contain an outline of a five-phased program and assessment of [text not declassified].]”  Vol XXVI-FRUS pp.379-380. #179 Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia (Ambassador Green) to the Department of State, - Djakarta, December 2, 1965  Marion Wilkinson, Hidden Holocaust - Spectrum Section - Sydney Morning Herald, July 10, 1999, Quoting Army Authorities in November 1965.  (Surat Pemerintah Sebelas Maret, the authorizing letter dated March 11, 1966).  Damien Kingsbury, The Politics of Indonesia, (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 64.  Vol XXVI-FRUS p. 417 # 200 Marshall Green, Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Djakarta, March 12, 1966, 1000Z - Quote: “2579. 1. Indonesia has just gone through its own perculiar form of military coup. At long last Sukarno has pushed his luck too far, and his plans to dump top army leadership and bring known-Communist in as Army Minister have triggered army action to curb his power. Way coup handled preserves Sukarno as unifying force and establishes army’s legitimacy. Army believes both of these are essential. At same time Suharto has KOGAM order number one full authority if he chooses to use it.”  Ibid. p. 417, footnote 3 to # 200 Marshall Green, Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State, Djakarta, March 12, 1966, 1000Z  Note: Web sites are prone to deletions and changed URLs– Use of GOOGLE is recommended to locate an alternative site.